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The Politics of LGBT Policy 
Adoption: Shibuya Ward’s Same-




This article will examine the determinants of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender) policy adoption in Shibuya, one of the twenty-three city 
wards of Tokyo, by taking an actor-specific approach to the first case of 
officially recognized same-sex partnership in Japan. How did the sexual 
minority issue become the subject of official agendas? How did actors 
both inside and outside the municipal government seize agenda-setting 
opportunities for government action? The results indicate that key policy 
makers’ entrepreneurship played a primary role in the official recognition 
of same-sex partnership by linking policy solutions with agenda-setting 
opportunities. This analysis demonstrates that the adoption of municipal 
LGBT policy does not necessarily reflect the redistribution of non-material 
resources, such as citizen values, but rather resembles the patterns of welfare 
politics.




On March 31, 2015, Shibuya, one of the twenty-three city wards of Tokyo, passed the Ordinance for Promoting Respect of Gender Equality and Diversity in the Ward. Article 10 introduces the issuance 
of “same-sex partnership certificates” for the first time in Japan. Why did 
Shibuya adopt the same-sex partnership policy when it did? There are three 
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possible causes for new policy adoption in a broad sense: increased need,1 
available financial resources, and changes to basic value structures.2 The first 
explanation for Shibuya’s new policy is as a direct response to increased 
need, as people living in Japanese metropolitan areas are exposed to more 
diverse lifestyles. Yet the demographic shifts and the emergence of community 
diversity and urbanism are too gradual to account for Shibuya’s stand-alone 
initiative to pass the ordinance. The second explanation can be found in 
most case studies about policy making that involve a large commitment of 
financial resources. In morally charged issue areas, such as same-sex 
partnership, the availability of financial resources cannot fully account for 
new policy adoption, since the redistribution of values, not economic self-
interests, are at stake.3 The third explanation is a reflection of value conflicts 
that may challenge the conventional interpretation of urban politics. Policy 
outputs may reflect changes in public opinion but deep-rooted value 
structures would not change significantly in a short period of time. In essence, 
new policy adoption is not an automatic product of structural factors, but 
reflects decisions made individually and collectively by human agents. This 
study will look beneath the aggregate relationships to more qualitative 
evidence of localized motives and behaviour for Shibuya’s initiative to issue 
“same-sex partnership certificates.”
This requires clear empirical research of human agents, who were able 
to individually and collectively interpret the political opportunity structures 
of the morally charged issue to meet locally specific needs. The literature 
on “morality politics” suggests that moral issues, such as same-sex marriage, 
constitute a distinctive type of policy formation through a redistribution of 
societal and religious values,4 while others challenge the morality politics 
framework by pointing out that the material interests of political actors are 
still the primary determinants of policy making.5 From this material interests-
based perspective, as interest groups, such as sexual minorities, lobby policy 
elites to protect their interests, interest group resources, policy elite attitudes, 
and existing public policies are the primary determinants of policy making. 
However, Donald Haider-Markel and Kenneth Meier argue that, when groups 
1 Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “The advocacy coalition framework: an assessment,” 
in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 149.
2  Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith identify public opinion shifts as “external shocks,” which are one 
prerequisite for changes to deep-rooted policy core beliefs. See Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, “The 
advocacy coalition framework,” 122. For these three causes as cross-national determinants for policy 
growth, see Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1975).
3  Elaine B. Sharp, “Introduction,” in Culture Wars and Local Politics, ed. Elaine B. Sharp 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1999), 8.
4  James D. Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: Basic, 1991); Kenneth 
J. Meier, The Politics of Sin: Drugs, Alcohol, and Public Policy (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Raymond 
Tatalovich and Byron W. Daynes, eds., Moral Controversies in American Politics (Armonk: Sharpe, 1998).
5  Ira Sharkansky, Spending in the American States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968); Paul Peterson, 









































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
opposed to minority rights expand “the scope of the conflict” to electoral 
competition, political conflicts become highly salient and the political pattern 
begins to resemble moral politics.6
The maintenance of social consensus is well known as a pervasive feature 
of Japanese society. Japan presents a difficult case study, where we would not 
expect minority groups to obtain official recognition in an easy way. To 
explore this country-specific case, a number of scholars emphasize the key 
role played by local authorities in coming up with a responsible solution to 
meet the need of minority protection.7 In the areas of minority issues that 
may address the fundamental values of society, however, there is a need to 
explain dissimilar cases in policy making, i.e., why morally charged issues 
become or do not become salient and politicized and how the patterns of 
morality politics, if any, can account for variation in policy making. It would 
appear that political opportunity structures (POSs)8 are the most useful 
approaches to cross-national comparisons of politics. The POS is used to 
explain how different structures determine the variations of agent behaviour, 
that is, how POSs allow or constrain actors to position themselves on morally 
charged issues and how these issues subsequently become a driving force in 
the formation of political coalitions and in electoral competition. However, 
although ascribing a significant part of policy adoption to morally charged 
issues, the POS tends to explain the basic features of politics, rather than 
illuminating the dynamic process in which opportunity structure translates 
into policy outcomes. In this respect, rather than focusing attention on the 
structural nature of state institutions, one may capture a dynamic ongoing 
process of policy making that stretches over a considerable time period and 
involves various interests and participants. To meet this analytical need, the 
role of actor-specific “policy entrepreneurs” is most suited for the analysis 
of such policy processes on a local scale.9 In urban areas, mayoral 
6  Donald P. Haider-Markel and Kenneth J. Meier, “The politics of gay and lesbian rights: 
expanding the scope of the conflict,” Journal of Politics 58, no. 2 (1996): 332–349. The scope of a 
political conflict is defined by multiple factors: involvement of actors, attention from the media and 
the public, issue characteristics and framing, political institutions, and policy processes. See Frank R. 
Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993).
7  Peter J. Herzog, Japan’s Pseudo-Democracy (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 89–91; 
Katherine Tegtmeyer Pak, “Foreigners are local citizens, too: local governments respond to 
international migration in Japan,” in Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a 
Multicultural Society, eds. Mike Douglass and Glenda S. Roberts (London: Routledge, 2000), 244–274; 
Seung-Mi Han, “From the communitarian ideal to the public sphere: the making of foreigners’ 
assemblies in Kawasaki city and Kanagawa prefecture,” Social Science Japan Journal 7, no. 1 (2004): 
41–60; Apichai W. Shipper, Fighting for Foreigners: Immigration and its Impact on Japanese Democracy 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 128–155.
8  Herbert Kitschelt, “Political opportunities structures and political protest: anti-nuclear 
movements in four democracies,” British Journal of Political Science 16 (1986): 57–85; Hanspeter Kriesi, 
et al., New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1995).
9  Alexander L. George, “Political leadership and social change in American cities,” Daedalus 
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entrepreneurship is a key ingredient affecting a city’s ability to introduce 
innovations. In this article, policy entrepreneur refers to an individual who 
possesses the skills and drive to make, within the constraints of limited initial 
resources, others behave in ways that he/she desires. The concept of policy 
entrepreneurship is also integrated within the agenda-setting analyses of new 
policy adoption. This agenda-setting theory focuses on the role played by 
policy entrepreneurs who exploit agenda-setting opportunities for policy 
solutions.10 Another important aspect of agenda setting for new policy 
adoption is issue definition (shaped by actors, issue attention, framing, issue 
characteristics) with which institutional control is combined to make possible 
a sudden shift in policy development.11
Finally, from the viewpoint of international relations scholars, minority 
rights are closely intertwined with the workings of international norms. 
International antidiscrimination norms inevitably work their influence 
through the efforts of domestic entrepreneurs.12 Indeed, Amy Gurowitz 
illustrates how these entrepreneurs, such as local authorities, use international 
norms in domestic contexts to push for policy changes.13 The legitimacy of 
international norms can provide a structural opportunity for agenda setting 
at the local level.
Therefore, state structures do not determine the specific content and 
course of decision making yet agenda setting takes place in the framework 
of state and societal institutions for policy change. In this article, an integrated 
approach encompassing both institutional structures and agenda setting will 
thus be considered to work in tandem.
____________________
Science Review 66, no. 2 (1972): 511–524; Mark Schneider, Paul Teske, and Michael Mintrom, Public 
Entrepreneurs: Agents for Change in American Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1995); Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari, “Policy networks and innovation diffusion: the case of 
state education reforms,” Journal of Politics 60 (1998): 126–148; Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs 
and School Choice (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000).
10  John W. Kingdon, Agenda, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1984), chapters 7 and 8. Kingdon’s understanding of “policy windows” is equivalent to social movement 
theorists’ concept of political opportunity structures, although this concept is applied to activists who 
must exploit the opportunities. See David S. Meyer, “Protest and political opportunities,” Annual 
Review of Sociology 30 (2004): 128.
11  Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics, 16. Matt Grossmann found 
it surprising that resource advantages do not necessarily lead to policy success in US issue-specific 
networks. See Matt Grossmann, “Interest group influence on U.S. policy change: an assessment based 
on policy history,” Interest Groups & Advocacy 1, no. 2 (2012): 171–192. In the EU context, a number 
of scholars have used the concept of policy entrepreneurs to illustrate policy changes, with special 
reference to policy framing and policy networks for promoting policy change. See, for example, Daniel 
Béland, “Ideas, institutions, and policy change,” Journal of European Public Policy 16 (2009): 701–718; 
Marcel Braun, “The evolution of emissions trading in the European Union—the role of policy networks, 
knowledge and policy entrepreneurs,” Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (2009): 469–487.
12  Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International norm dynamics and political change,” 
International Organization 52, no. 4 (1988): 887–917.
13  Amy Gurowitz, “Mobilizing international norms: domestic actors, immigrants, and the Japanese 









































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
Issue-specific Opportunity Structure
To explore Japan’s politics of LGBT policy making, we need to distinguish 
between “general openness in the polity” and “openness to particular 
constituencies, that is, issue-specific opportunities.”14 In general, Japan’s 
coalition behaviour is framed by a low degree of “openness” in the political 
opportunity structure, that is, high territorial centralization and one-party 
dominance in a unitary state. The structural nature of Japan’s state institutions 
is less likely to provide the political opportunity structures that induce the 
formation of coalition building to create a dynamic process of high 
competition between coalitions of actors. The dominant governing coalition 
tends to control a given policy subsystem and produce coalition stability over 
a long period of time.15 One of the most important opportunity structures, 
peculiar to morality politics, which channel societal demands into the political 
system, concerns whether major political parties are closely tied to religious 
groups. The answer to this question produces “two worlds of morality 
politics”: the religious world and the secular world.16 Morality issues are most 
likely to be politicized by religion-affiliated major parties in party systems 
(e.g., those in Austria, Belgium, and Germany). In Japan, there are no major 
religious parties (except for a ruling coalition junior partner, Kōmeitō) and 
the majority of major conservative parties are unwilling to adopt a set of 
indivisible social values over other sets of competing values, thus emphasizing 
the rhetorical principles of conservative values. The secularized party system 
is not driven by a set of predetermined values, but rather shaped by a matter 
of non-straightforward conflict definition. Major conservative parties’ 
concerns with social values provide a political opportunity for keeping a low 
degree of openness in the policy subsystem of morality issues. As LGBT issues 
have not as yet become heavily politicized, the narrow scope of conflict is less 
likely to increase the political salience and will advantage the dominant 
conservative coalition. The politics of the low salient issue do not generally 
result in two competing coalitions formed around policy core beliefs and/or 
partisanship. The party in power tends to avoid political actors other than 
minority LGBT groups and thus seeks to maintain the dominant governing 
coalition. To this end, conservative political elites will not change their 
conservative policy beliefs yet may incrementally revise prior public policies 
(i.e., specific policy instruments, not policy core beliefs) to acknowledge 
14  David S. Meyer and Debra C. Minkoff, “Conceptualizing political opportunity,” Social Forces 
82, no. 4 (2004): 15–48.
15  Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, “An advocacy coalition model of policy change 
and the role of policy oriented learning therein,” Policy Sciences 21, no. 2–3 (1988): 141f, 142.
16  Isabelle Engeli, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Lars Thorup Larsen, Morality Politics in Western 
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LGBT rights to some degree.17 This narrow scope does not reveal a distinct 
type of politics over morally charged issues but rather is consistent with interest 
group politics that sees political actors as being instrumentally rational.
However, the issue-specific opportunity structure of morality politics 
suggests that once morality policies evoke a widespread response from the 
public, conservative politicians could be dragged into electoral competition. 
As the scope of the conflict expands, the influence of interest groups decreases 
in policy making.18 Strong party competition is likely to increase the level of 
openness to citizens’ voices. As LGBT issues challenge deep-rooted religious 
beliefs, elected officials often need to reduce the policy to a normative stance 
on right or wrong. LGBT policy will be increasingly influenced by the 
distribution of citizen values, party competition, and partisanship, and thus 
shape the patterns of morality politics.19 In Japan, the citizen values that are 
reflected in public opinion are not divisive enough to send a warning signal 
to national policy makers.20 On 10 March 2015, Ganbare Nippon (Stand Firm, 
Japan!, a right-wing political group)21 organized a protest in front of Shibuya 
Ward office against the proposed same-sex partnership, while a counter-protest 
was staged in central Shibuya by LGBT support groups. Nonetheless, nationally 
organized interest groups such as Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference, another 
right-wing lobby group)22 opposed to LGBT rights have yet to expand the 
scope of the LGBT-related conflict in interest group politics at the national 
17  See Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible, “The advocacy coalition framework: 
innovations and clarification,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. Paul A. Sabatier (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 2007), 194–196.
18  Elmer Eric Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 
1960).
19  Haider-Markel and Meier, “The politics of gay and lesbian rights.”
20  Since 1981, the World Values Survey has asked respondents in various countries to give their 
levels of acceptance toward homosexuality on a scale from 1 (“never justifiable”) to 10 (“always 
justifiable”). The average score in the United States (5.4 points in 2010) puts it about in the middle 
of scores for member countries of the OECD, where acceptance levels continue to increase. Yet, in 
2010, while 22.2 percent of respondents in the US gave their attitude toward homosexuality 10 points, 
24.9 percent of the population still gave it 1 point. The American public is evenly divided over the 
morality of homosexuality. The average score in Japan (5.1 points in 2010) likewise places it in the 
middle ranks, though the number of respondents who gave it 10 points has risen rapidly, from 2.0 
percent in 1981 to 14.4 percent in 2010. Yet the relatively high 21.5 percent of Japanese people 
surveyed who gave it 1 point in 2010 would seem to indicate that conservative values on this issue in 
Japan remain very influential. See World Values Survey, WVS Data-Archive, 2016, http://www.
worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSPublicationsPresentations.jsp, accessed 3 May 2016.
21  In February 2010, the inauguration of this political group was led by filmmaker Satoru 
Mizushima and former Self-Defense Force officer Toshio Tamogami, with 2,600 nationalists in 
attendance. See Wall Street Journal, “Japan’s nationalist movement strengthens,” 14 August 2012.
22  Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference) is the largest right-wing advocacy network in Japan, which 
united right-wing movements in the mid-1990s under the banner of rebuilding “traditional values of 
Japan.” This rising nationalism is known as “Tea Party politics in Japan.” The network has 242 local 
chapters and around 38,000 fee-paying members, including approximately 230 National Diet members 
who are mostly conservatives from the LDP. One of the targets for national unity is the elimination 
of gender-free education, but they have not yet directly addressed the issue of same-sex marriage. See 










































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
level. A large proportion of LGBT policy measures in Japan are not driven 
by a strong top-down national undertaking. The absence of national guidance 
and the national government’s inaction present an opening for proactive 
LGBT policy at the local level but it does not open the opportunity structures 
wide enough to progressively expand a pro-LGBT coalition to the national 
level. Morality issues also present a challenge to the traditional analytical 
framework of urban politics, which is fought around the allocation of 
economic resources or material interests.23 Indivisible moral values are now 
at stake in many urban issues such as same-sex marriages. The priority of local 
authorities has been to provide for the consumption requirements of various 
groups in the local population.24 I claim that local governments are at the 
forefront of coping with community diversity and urbanism and, because of 
the national government’s reluctance to manage the new redistribution of 
social values, they are in a position to ensure the enhancement of the 
community’s diverse lifestyles. In this context, a local to national flow of policy 
transfer is politically feasible when the redistribution of social values comes 
to reflect the influence of electoral and party competition at the national 
level. Otherwise, inter-local flows are likely to dominate the processes of policy 
diffusion in the area of morally charged issues.
Sexual Minority Status in the Japanese Legal System
Japan’s democratic constitution, which went into effect in 1947, states: 
“Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it 
shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of 
husband and wife as a basis” (Article 24). The intent of the provision was to 
abolish the old system of a patriarchal household and respect the freedom 
of consenting adults to marry but not to emphasize that marriage must exist 
solely between a man and a woman. Some scholars argue further that, since 
Article 13, which states, “All of the people shall be respected as individuals,” 
is a general provision for the guarantee of fundamental human rights, the 
special family-related provision of Article 24 should be interpreted in tandem 
with Article 13. In their view, Article 24 is applicable to same-sex couples.25 
Although Article 13 declares that individuals’ rights “shall be the supreme 
consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs,” no statutory 
23  Elaine Sharp, “Introduction,” in Culture Wars and Local Politics, ed. Elaine Sharp (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1999), 1–20.
24  Peter Saunders, “Rethinking local politics,” in Local Socialism? Labour Councils and New 
Alternatives, eds. Martin Boddy and Colin Fudge (London: Macmillan, 1984), 22–48.
25  See for example, Shūhei Ninomiya, Kazuku-hō [Family law], 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Shinseisha, 2005), 
38–39; Takahiro Sasaki, “Nihon ni okeru seiteki mainorite sabetsu to rippō seisaku – (2)” [Legislative 
policy and discrimination against sexual minorities in Japan – part 2], Kokusai kōkyō seisaku kenkyū 18, 
no. 1 (2013): 229–230; Yoshikazu Yamashita, “Shibuya-ku jōrei no igi: pātonāshippu kara dōseikon 
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regulations in Japan have been legislated for same-sex marriages. In short, 
the Japanese legal system has continually ignored sexual minority issues, 
although not explicitly criminalizing homosexual behaviour.
Under the rule of law, the use of litigation as a conflict-solving mechanism 
is common among minority groups in Japan, as the problems of minority 
groups do not directly affect the majority of the population. The judicial 
system provides minority groups with an institutionalized opportunity to 
have a considerable impact on the climate of public opinion. In the 1990s, 
exploiting the judicial opportunity, Japanese gay and lesbian activists, such 
as the Society of Gay and Lesbian Activists, also tried to move sexual minority 
issues into this specific institutional arena. Perhaps the most publicized case 
was the one in which the Tokyo Metropolitan Government refused to allow 
a LGBT group called OCCUR to use government-owned facilities in 1990. 
In 1997 the Tokyo High Court ordered the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
to pay damages to the group, arguing that the defendant should have proper 
knowledge and sensitivity about homosexuality.26 Still, recourse to lawsuits 
is unlikely to result in a transcendence of the confines of the existing legal 
system. Such actions are less likely to lead to new policy or a new policy belief; 
at most, they might legally force the government to change the scope of 
existing policy in an incremental way.
In response to Shibuya’s local initiatives, the mass media often reported 
it as a stepping stone to the legalization of same-sex marriages at the national 
level.27 In the Japanese context, however, the political implication of 
recognizing same-sex couples as having an equal right to marry under the 
existing legal system reveals a serious impediment toward promoting the 
protection of sexual minorities’ rights. There are Japan-specific legal 
conditions that both parties must meet in order to lawfully marry each other. 
Probably the most difficult hurdle to overcome for the legalization of same-
sex marriage is the current system of koseki (Japan’s family registry system), 
which serves to record and certify an individual’s identity, not by the unit of 
the individual, but by the unit of ko (the administrative household).28 Despite 
the legal and social reforms in postwar Japan, the family registry system 
continues to function as a remnant of the prewar system that espouses the 
ideology of patriarchy.29 This ideology is based on the norm of heterosexuality 
and so views the personal relationships of same-sex couples as illegitimate, 
leading to the constitutional interpretation of Article 24 that marriage is 
26  “Gays win lodging discrimination suit against Tokyo,” Japan Times, 16 September 1997.
27  See for example, “Shasetsu” [Editorial], Tokyo shinbun, 27 March 2015; “Dōseikon kuni ga 
mitomete” [State needs to recognize same-sex marriages], Mainichi shinbun, 16 December 2015.
28  Vera Mackie, “Birth registration and the right to have rights: the changing family and 
unchanging Koseki,” in Japan’s Household Registration System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification and 
Documentation, eds. Karl Jakob Krogness and David Chapman (London: Routledge, 2014), 203–221.
29  See, for example, Lindale White, “Challenging the heteronormative family in the koseki: 











































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
exclusive to opposite-sex couples. When a couple marries, they must file a 
notification of their marriage to create a new koseki for the household. 
Marriage is not legally binding until the municipal office grants the new 
family registry. Each family registry must have only one surname name and 
one head of the household. The person who is listed at the top of the family 
registry is called the hittōsha (first-listed person) and all other family members 
are recorded under his or her surname. If same-sex marriage is legalized 
and incorporated into the existing legal marriage system, the official records 
of personal status and the family relations could become an ideological tool 
of state control over LGBT rights. LGBT support networks in Japan, such as 
Rainbow Talk 2006, are facing a situation of much greater complexity between 
the legal protection of sexual minority rights and a potential risk of state 
control over the freedom of same-sex marriages.30 Therefore, the legal system 
of the family registry continues to create the high degree of “closedness” to 
particular constituencies, i.e., sexual minorities, in the political opportunity 
structure.
Japanese National Politics of LGBT Issues
In Japan, while gender identity disorder (GID) was a taboo subject, in 1997 
the Japanese Society of Psychiatry and Neurology’s Special Committee 
announced a guideline that acknowledged sex reassignment surgery as 
proper medical conduct. In May 2001 Masae Torai and five other transsexual 
plaintiffs filed civil lawsuits to have their registered genders changed, while 
petitioning the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare to change their 
registered sex on insurance and social security documents. Family courts 
failed to endorse such changes to the family registry, except for the case of 
“factual error” that had been made in the initial entry.31 In the same month, 
a working group for GID-related legislation was created among the ruling 
parties and its draft proposal for GID law was approved within the governing 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) a month later. In January 2003, the advocacy 
NAO group (No Assignment of Opposite Gender), which was led by Torai, 
began to lobby legislators, such as LDP Diet member Chieko Noono (a nurse 
scientist), who had chaired the working group.32 In April 2003 assembly 
councillor Aya Kamikawa, who became the first elected transsexual politician 
in Japan for the Setagaya Ward Assembly, joined the group’s lobbying 
activities.33 In July 2003 the National Diet passed the Act on Special Cases in 
30  Tetsuya Shida, “Dōseikekkon hihan” [A critical analysis of same-sex marriage], in Chōhatsu 
suru sekushariti [Provocative sexuality], eds. Tetsuya Shida and Osamu Seki (Tokyo: Shinsensha, 2009), 
133–167; Yuri Horie, “Dōseikan no kon’in ni kansuru hikanteki kōsatsu” [A critical analysis of same-
sex marriage], Shakai shisutemu kenkyū 21(2010): 37–57.
31  “Court vetoes gender change on Family Register,” Mainichi shinbun, 29 August 2002.
32  Masae Torai, Otoko no koseki o kudasai [Give us the male koseki] (Tokyo: Mainichi shinbun, 
2003), 144–145, 150–152.
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Handling Gender for People with Gender Identity Disorder, which permits 
an applicant with GID to legally change their gender in the family registry. 
The family registry, which is embedded in the remnants of patriarchy in 
gender relations, would function as a device to force the legal gender change 
to follow the norm of heterosexuality.34 It would appear that the legal 
conditions attached to gender change show the governing LDP’s reluctance 
to address sexual minority issues and its adherence to a heterosexual norm. 
The law requires that the applicant must be unmarried and have no children. 
As discussed in the working group, these conditions were intended to avoid 
the resultant same-sex marriages and same-sex parents when married 
individuals with children change their sex.35 The conditions reveal that 
minority policies are more likely to be adopted when the protection of 
minorities does not directly conflict with majority interests. Another case in 
point was the 1997 Ainu Cultural Promotion Law that would promote the 
right of indigenous people to maintain their own cultural traditions, but 
avoided any acknowledgement of Ainu calls for land rights.36
The LDP thus expresses little support for sexual minority rights and seeks 
to maintain the norm of heterosexuality. In relation to the literature, the 
political salience of the morality issue is not considered high enough to be 
a primary campaign issue at national elections. The narrower scope of the 
conflict to electoral politics advantages the LDP and lags behind in providing 
opportunity structures to sexual minority support groups. Indeed, in recent 
surveys, while Japanese politicians began to use the term mainoriti (minority) 
in the early 2000s,37 the LDP continues to uphold the status quo and be less 
sympathetic towards sexual minority issues. The surveys, which were 
conducted by Rainbow Pride Ehime during the campaigns for Lower House 
elections in 2012 and 2014, asked the national headquarters of the political 
parties about their views on sexual minority issues.38 In both surveys, among 
six parties responding to the survey questions, it was only the LDP that 
opposed both legalized same-sex marriage and civil partnership. With regard 
to sexual minority rights, the LDP replied, “Measures are necessary for people 
with gender identity disorder but not for homosexuals.” Responding to 
34  Mariko Tsutsui, “Keshisarareta genda no shiten: seidōitsu seishōgai ho no mondaiten” 
[Viewpoint of erased gender: the problems of GID law], Inpakushon 137 (2003): 174–181; Yuri Horie, 
“Seiteki shōsūsha no shintai to kokka no shōnin” [Sexual minority’s body and the state’s recognition], 
Kaihō shakaigaku kenkyū 21 (2007): 43–61.
35  Horie, “Seiteki shōsūsha no shintai to kokka no shōnin,” 49.
36  Kaori Takeda, “Mainoriti o meguru seiji katei bunseki no tame no rironteki kōsatsu” 
[Theoretical consideration for the analysis of political processes over minorities], GEMC Journal 3 
(2010): 153.
37  Akiko Iwama, “Nihon ni okeru mainoriti” [Minorities in Japan], in Mainoriti towa nanika: 
gainen to seisaku no hikaku shakaigaku [What is a minority? Comparative sociology of concept and 
policy], eds. Akiko Iwama and Kōshō Rysh (Kyoto: Minerva, 2007), 58.
38  Rainbow Pride Ehime, “Lower House election of 2012,” 2012, http://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/
project_gl05/63786456.html, accessed 3 May 2016; Rainbow Pride Ehime, “Lower House election of 










































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
Shibuya Ward’s same-sex partnership certificates, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe 
said, “The current constitution does not envisage marriage between people 
of the same sex.”39 The LDP thus offers unconditional support on the social 
value of gender dualism, although some LDP lawmakers, such as Yōko 
Kawakami (justice minister), Karen Makishima, and Hiroshi Hase, have 
individually spoken out in favour of sexual minority issues. At the National 
Diet, a nonpartisan lawmakers’ federation was established in January 2015 
for jointly proposing a LGBT anti-discrimination bill, with members from 
the LDP, Kōmeitō, the Democratic Party, and others.40 Perhaps the most 
fundamental condition for policy change is changes in basic social values—in 
particular, views on and clear understandings of LGBT rights. Changes in 
the importance of citizen values expressed in public opinion could increase 
issue salience and provide a strong signal to elected policy makers in Japan’s 
secular party system. Policy makers’ actual attentiveness to what people think 
(or policy makers’ perceived salience) then increases the likelihood of policy 
change.
Shibuya’s Adoption of LGBT Inclusive Policies
At the national level, LGBT support groups and academics interact with 
sympathetic LDP lawmakers, but the sexual minority group representing 
only “7.6 percent” of the Japanese population is yet to receive strong support 
from the straight majority for electoral competition.41 The LDP has been 
challenged by LGBT support groups but the distribution of power is so 
concentrated that the interaction has been very limited. The scope of conflict 
over sexual minority rights is so narrow that the governing conservative 
coalition does not seek to reduce the policy to morality politics or a normative 
right or wrong at the national level. So far the LDP has tried to neutralize 
the minority demands, in order to maintain the existence of its conservative 
values. The GID law is a case in point. The legislation was only an incremental 
change from the existing family law to avoid a direct conflict with the minority 
group. The legislative intention may appear to be supportive of LGBT rights, 
yet as discussed above, the application of the law will end up preserving the 
norm of heterosexuality. This legislative manipulation is closely linked to 
the closed opportunity structures that are less likely to create a dynamic 
process of competing coalitions. Given the low degree of openness in the 
LGBT policy subsystem, the debate on sexual minority rights has thus become 
localized to seek new institutional venues and increase attention from the 
media and a community audience.
39  House of Councillors, Minutes of plenary session, 189th session of the Diet, 18 February 2015.
40  “LGBT chōtōha giin sabestu bōshi e rippō kentō” [LGBT nonpartisan federation of law-makers 
will investigate on legislative measures for anti-discrimination], Tokyo shinbun, 28 January 2015.
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The opportunity structure in central-local relations
Japan operates under state-centric governance, in which the unitary system 
is institutionalized to establish a division of labour among levels of government 
with a state-centric gate-keeping capacity (its capacity to influence policy 
decisions). Local governments have primarily an implementation role to 
play if top-down national policy targets are to be met. However, the static 
notion of such governance cannot easily account for the dynamics of real-life 
experience in Japan. Japanese local governments often interpret the role of 
the opportunity structures and adapt them to meet their own locally specific 
needs without, normally, completely superseding the hierarchical order. The 
LDP’s reluctance to address sexual minority rights or its indecisive stance 
that same-sex marriages are neither legalized nor prohibited has created the 
openness of political opportunities for urban governments to exploit for 
policy change at the local level. Indeed, in response to Shibuya’s proposed 
ordinance for same-sex partnership, Sadakazu Tanigaki, secretary-general 
of the LDP, conceded the absence of a legal code for same-sex marriage by 
saying: “I think there would be huge repercussions in our society if a 
municipality began to address such a fundamental problem on its own when 
there is no related national law in place.”42 In Shibuya, local chief executives 
and LGBT support groups deliberately moved the sexual minority issues into 
a different institutional venue: local government. They sought to meet the 
need of community diversity in an autonomous policy process with little 
interference from the national government. They successfully framed the 
issue of same-sex partnership by describing the painful hardships of the 
minority groups, such as hospitals’ refusal to give visitation rights to their 
partners at intensive care units, rather than promoting it as a matter of 
abstract civil rights.43 In late April 2015, Ken Hasebe, who proposed 
recognition of same-sex partnership in Shibuya, became its new mayor.
Agent’s localized motives and actions
Those who live in urban areas are exposed to diverse life styles and are more 
inclusive and appreciative of differences.44 A positive relationship between 
educational level and tolerance for diversity has also been noted by many 
42  “Tanigaki-shi, dōsei kappuru jōreian ni kenen hōritsu to no seigōsei shiteki” [Mr. Tanigaki is 
concerned about the proposed same-sex partnership ordinance and points out its compatibility with 
law], Asahi shinbun, 10 March 2015. Article 94 of Japan’s constitution states: “Local public entities 
shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and administration and to enact their own 
regulations (local ordinance) within law” [italics added].
43  For local government’s initiatives to take such a pragmatic stance toward a visible minority 
problem, see Katherine Tegtmeyer Pak, “Cities and local citizenships in Japan: overcoming nationality?” 
in Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective, ed. Takeyuki 
Tsuda (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 67.
44  See, for example, David C. Nice, “State deregulation of intimate behavior,” Social Science 











































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
researchers.45 These environmental parameters are expected to structure 
the political process of policy making. Functionalists tend to assume that 
policy making is carried out in response to such environmental factors or 
collective needs yet neglect the dynamic process of governance in which 
agents purposively steer a polity. Let us take the example of the twenty-three 
city wards of Tokyo, where youth migration to these wards has been shaping 
the diversity of communities. Minato, Chiyoda, and Shibuya wards are 
exceptional in their environmental factors that influence citizens’ tolerance 
for community diversity: working-age population (as percentage of total 
population—the national average is 60.7 percent), income (per taxpayer 
income—the national average is ¥3.2 million), and education (university 
graduates as percentage of total population—the national average is 20.9 
percent). The measurement of the enabling factors indicates that these wards 
have ranked among the top three municipalities in Japan: 71.5 percent, ¥9.0 
million, 52.2 percent for Minato; 70.1 percent, ¥7.6 million, 53.4 percent 
for Chiyoda; and 72.5 percent, ¥6.8, 47.2 percent for Shibuya, respectively.46 
Yet the three wards, with their similar environments, are not all equally 
responsive to sexual minority issues. In the case of Shibuya Ward, the human 
agents were able to collectively interpret the opportunity structures and fit 
them to the locally specific conditions of sexual minority issues. This study 
finds that the agent effects largely explain why Shibuya adopted the policy 
while others with a similar policy environment did not.
Hasebe, who used to work for an advertising agency and had business 
contacts with LGBT individuals, played a key role in getting the recognition 
of same-sex partnership on the local agenda in Shibuya. In 2003 he 
successfully ran as an independent candidate for the Shibuya Ward Assembly 
and served as a ward councillor for three consecutive terms (2003–2015). 
In April 2015 he won the mayoral race on a platform of creating an 
international city of diversity. He is a successful entrepreneur who attempted 
to persuade a limited segment of Shibuya’s political elite and interests groups 
to endorse his policy ideas rather than waiting for the spontaneous formation 
of a community consensus. Around 2012, as ward councillor, he utilized his 
skillful entrepreneurial skills by framing the inclusive LGBT policies in a way 
that would offer a solution favouring the policy stakeholders’ political leaning. 
Generally speaking, LGBT groups seek to present the issue of same-sex 
45  See, for example, Richard Seltzer, “AIDS, homosexuality, public opinion, and changing 
correlates over time,” Journal of Homosexuality 26, no. 1 (1993): 85–97; James L. Gibson, “Homosexuals 
and the Ku Klux Klan: a contextual analysis of political tolerance,” Western Political Quarterly 40, no. 
3 (1987): 427–448. A recent study on Japan’s acceptance of homosexuality also confirms a positive 
relationship between education and acceptance as well as between urban living and acceptance. See 
Hideki Ishihara, “Nihon ni okeru dōseiai ni taisuru kanyō no kakudai” [Increasing levels of tolerance 
toward homosexuality in Japan], Sōkan shakaigaku 22 (2012): 23–41.
46  The figures in this section are based on Statistics Bureau, “Heisei 22-nen kokusei chōsa,” 
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partnership as pertaining to civil rights while their opponents address it as 
a moral issue. Hasebe effectively facilitated greater inclusion for those Shibuya 
councillors who had little interest in sexual minority issues. He recalled: “In 
the past, we had often called for LGBT protections as a human rights issue 
but I decided to approach the issue in a locally-specific Shibuya way under 
the slogan of building cultural diversity in the international city.”47 The media 
coverage of former Takarazuka performer Koyuki Higashi and her partner 
Hiroko Masuhara, who were actively advocating the proposed ordinance as 
a civil rights issue, and were the first recipient couple of Shibuya’s same-sex 
partnership certificate, drew public attention to same-sex partnership. While 
the proposed ordinance on same-sex partnership gained a high level of 
media attention, the policy process of this local innovation was characterized 
by the involvement of a limited group of actors who had a direct interest in 
the issue. The morally charged same-sex partnership issue produced the less 
distinctive process of policy making, which lacked an overt moral dimension, 
than morality politics theory would anticipate.
In 2003 Hasebe established a voluntary group called “green bird,” and 
started a campaign to “clean the town” in Harajuku/Omotesandō (part of 
Shibuya Ward). The anti-litter campaign spread to other parts of Japan, 
including Kabukichō (part of Shinjuku Ward) where LGBT Japanese 
comfortably express their sexuality in public. He met many sexual minority 
volunteers and learned first hand about the problems they face in their day-
to-day lives. He closely discussed the real experiences and feelings of sexual 
minorities with transgender activist Fumino Sugiyama, who became a strong 
information provider in the agenda-setting process of Shibuya’s same-sex 
partnership certificates.48 Over time Hasebe came to believe it was necessary 
for Shibuya to become a mature urban community and that its public spaces 
must be more inclusive and appreciative of differences.49 In June 2012, he 
proposed same-sex partnership certificates to symbolically recognize same-
sex couples and, in favour of building Shibuya’s community diversity, then 
mayor Toshitake Kuwabara promised to explore the possibility of issuing 
such certificates to be congruent with national policy and law.50 While 
continuing to emphasize the importance of community diversity, Hasebe’s 
proposal gained strong support within the ward assembly. Another 
independent assembly councillor, Mari Okada, who had studied in 
Massachusetts and was familiar with LGBT issues in the US, requested swift 
action from the mayor.51 In July 2014 Mayor Kuwabara created an Investigative 
47  Shibuya Ward Assembly, Minutes of plenary session, 8 June 2012, 99–116; Ken Hasebe, interview 
by author, Tokyo, 22 April 2016.
48  Kira Esmralda, Dōsei pātonāshippu shōmei hajimarimashita [Japan’s first same-sex partnership 
certificate] (Tokyo: Pot Pub Co., 2015), 10–51.
49 Ken Hasebe, interview by author, Tokyo, 22 April 2016; Shūji Minato (Secretary of Mayor’s 
Office, Shibuya Ward), interview by author, Tokyo, 22 April 2016.
50  Shibuya Ward Assembly, Minutes of plenary session, 8 June 2012, 107–110.










































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
Commission on the Enactment of Shibuya Ward’s Ordinance for Promoting 
Respect of Community Diversity. In other words, without explicitly 
challenging the established central-local government relations, the mayor 
nevertheless attempted to exploit the opening of a policy window in the 
absence of a legal code for same-sex marriage.52 Local government thus 
occupies a strategic position to implement a cohesive policy that would meet 
specific local needs, due to a lack of support from national government.
The commission was initially comprised of eight representatives: 
academics, lawyers, and Shibuya Ward’s employees. LGBT people were invited 
to share their experiences with the commission members, which presented 
a key opportunity for vigorous discussion. One of the members, a former 
superintendent of education, admitted that never in her entire professional 
career had she been aware of the existence of LGBT children.53 The 
experiences of LGBT people served as an impetus that assisted the 
commission in embarking toward a process of serious inquiry, with eye-
opening results. In January 2015 the commission submitted to the mayor a 
report that suggested the issuance of certificates for same-sex couples as well 
as protective measures for other community diversity issues. It also 
emphasized the importance of commitment to same-sex partnership by 
including two application requirements: a notarized deed to declare that 
each would act as a guardian for their partner and a notarized document 
promising they will live together.54 To pass an ordinance, the main thrust by 
pro-same-sex partnership councillors in the ward assembly was to promote 
the sexual minority issue as an opportunity to create Shibuya’s cutting image 
at home and abroad rather than for the sake of civil rights per se. Hasebe 
pushed the issue by saying, “We need to be on par with London, New York 
and San Francisco as a cultural center.”55 As same-sex partnership was a 
potentially divisive issue the mayor had to grapple with in the ward assembly, 
he decided to address it as a matter of building cultural diversity in the 
international city. He successfully promoted it as a matter of community 
development rather than that of a divisive redistribution of societal and 
religious values involved in sexual minority issues. The relatively low salience 
of same-sex partnership in the agenda-setting process provided him with the 
opening of a policy window to move the item of same-sex partnership onto 
formal municipal agendas.
52  For the argument on such available political space, see Katherine Tegtmeyer Pak, “Foreigners 
are local citizens, too: local governments respond to international migration in Japan,” in Japan and 
Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, eds. M. Douglass and G.S. 
Roberts (London: Routledge, 2000), 245.
53  Ken Hasebe, interview by author, Tokyo, 22 April 2016; Esmralda, Dōsei pātonāshippu shōmei 
hajimarimas, 43–46.
54  Shibuya Ward Assembly, Minutes of plenary session, 3 March 2015, 111–114.
55  “Gay rights movement gains steam in Japan,” Wall Street Journal, 3 June 2015. Some researchers 
would say that he felt “international pressure” to take such a municipal initiative. See, for example, 
Jacob Ausderan, “How naming and shaming affects human rights perceptions in the shamed country,” 
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In February 2015 the news of Shibuya’s decision to propose an ordinance 
on “partnership certificates” received national media attention.56 On March 
31, 2015, the ward assembly passed by majority vote the Ordinance for 
Promoting Respect of Gender Equality and Diversity in the ward. Article 4 
of the ordinance specifically refers to respect for the “human rights” of 
sexual minorities and Article 10 introduces the issuance of “partnership 
certificates” by the ward. In 2003 Kuwabara was first elected as mayor of 
Shibuya Ward with a strong endorsement from the national LDP, yet as he 
served three four-year terms, he became less responsive to LDP’s conservative 
leadership. Indeed, when the ward assembly was about to pass the ordinance, 
the Tokyo chapter of the LDP stated, “If by any chance the ordinance is 
passed, our next mayor will repeal it.”57 All 7 LDP councillors and 3 
independents out of 31 votes opposed it.58 The national headquarters of the 
LDP did not allow free votes for those LDP members, although only two LDP 
councillors unconditionally opposed the official recognition of same-sex 
partnership.59 Some commentators individually warned of the danger of a 
“collapse of family values,”60 yet as pro-same-sex partnership forces did not 
always seek to portray their objectives as purely civil rights issues, anti-same-
sex partnership forces did not overtly bring a normative right or wrong 
dimension either. The assembly debate largely focused on partner benefits, 
which were less morally controversial than partnership registration itself.61 
The key conservative councillors, such as LDP councillor Mari Sato, did not 
have a genuine interest in politicizing the policy agenda as a morality issue 
as it appeared that the Shibuya residents accepted it as an issue of community 
diversity.62
The deliberation at the ward assembly clearly indicates that the intention 
of the ordinance was not to merely offer a legal framework through same-sex 
partnership, but rather to promote the social recognition of same-sex 
partnership developed from the interaction of individuals in the community.63 
The social recognition, which would help shape the values of citizens in the 
community, was expected to offer practical solutions to the problems that 
same-sex couples face in their day-to-day lives, such as co-signing of tenancy 
agreements for rental housing, hospital visitation and medical decision-
making rights for their partners, and family-related employment benefits.64 
Although not legally binding, the ordinance prohibits businesses, hospitals, 
56  See for example, “Shibuya Ward plans vote on same-sex marriage,” Japan Times, 12 February 
2015.
57  Shūji Minato, interview by author, Tokyo, 22 April 2016.
58  Shibuya Ward Assembly, Minutes of plenary session, 31 March 2015, 186–196.
59  Ken Hasebe, interview by author, Tokyo, 22 April 2016.
60  Esmralda, Dōsei pātonāshippu shōmei hajimarimas, 57.
61  See for example, Shibuya Ward Assembly, Minutes of plenary session, 5 June 2015, 99–106.
62  Shibuya Ward Assembly, Minutes of plenary session, 31 March 2015, 187–188.
63  Shibuya Ward Assembly, Minutes of plenary session, 2 March 2015, 60–72.











































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
real estate firms, and residents in Shibuya from discriminating against sexual 
minorities. The mayor can also “guide” and “recommend” those organizations 
and individuals, if considered necessary, to treat holders of the certificates 
in the same way as married couples (Article 15–2,3). He can even threaten 
to name and shame violators (Article 15–4). The jurisdiction granted to the 
mayor could function as a de facto legal binding instrument and deter 
discrimination.
Following the passage of the ordinance, the outgoing mayor of Shibuya 
endorsed Hasebe to be his successor as new mayor, and Hasebe succeeded 
in winning the vote. This election was a closely watched three-way competition 
between the LDP-backed candidate, opposition-backed candidate, and 
Hasebe, without official support from any political parties. The LDP-backed 
candidate polled 29.1 percent, the opposition-backed candidate polled 31.2 
percent, and the independent candidate polled 36.4 percent.65 According 
to Japan Broadcasting Corporation’s exit polls, Hasebe gained the most 
unaffiliated votes. He was adept at using his same-sex partnership initiative, 
together with the incumbent mayor’s endorsement, to effectively attract 
publicity. Nonetheless, he strategically did not run on a single issue (sexual 
minority issue), but through a platform of broad policies for the majority, 
as the two other candidates did.66
Policy diffusion as a determinant
In 1989 Denmark became the first country to establish a national system of 
“registered partnerships” for both homosexual and heterosexual couples 
and it was quickly followed by other Scandinavian countries. The Investigative 
Commission on the Enactment of Shibuya Ward’s Ordinance for Promoting 
Respect of Community Diversity acted as a transfer agent, shuttling knowledge 
about registered partnerships and the Nordic model, which was then 
introduced to the office of Shibuya’s mayor.67 The mayor and pro-same-sex 
partnership ward councillors accepted the fundamental ideas of registered 
same-sex partnerships, but the transferred policy instruments had to be 
adapted to the urban scale and the locally specific needs. There was little 
practical experience to be gained from other municipalities in Japan, since 
at that time, no Japanese local governments had created such a system under 
the enactment of local ordinances. The mayor innovatively uncovered the 
65  Shibuya Ward, “Mayor April 26, 2015 execution Shibuya election vote breaking news,[sic]” 
2015, http://www.city.shibuya.tokyo.jp.e.mu.hp.transer.com/eac/voting/20150426tou_k.html, 
accessed 15 August 2016.
66  Ken Hasebe, interview by author, Tokyo, 22 April 2016; Esmralda, Dōsei pātonāshippu shōmei 
hajimarimas, 54–55.
67  Shibuya Ward Assembly, Minutes of plenary session, 2 March 2015, 7. For arguments on local 
governments as transfer agents for policy learning from abroad, see Harold Wolman and Ed Page, 
“Policy transfer among local governments: an information-theory approach,” Governance 15, no. 4 
(2002): 477–501; Michele M. Betsill and Harriet Bulkeley, “Transnational networks and global 
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little-known issue of sexual minorities by linking it to the topic of the 
international city’s cultural diversity. The lawyers and academics who worked 
with the commission dealt with the practical effects on the day-to-day 
protection of sexual minorities, so that they would not come into conflict 
with the Family Registration Law yet get closer to the actual benefits of a 
legal registration of marriage.68 In supporting Shibuya’s urban community 
building as a whole, the commission did not want it to appear as if they were 
narrowly focused on the issue of a “partnership ordinance,” but rather 
successfully proposed an ordinance of the multiple dimensions of community 
diversity, according to which Shibuya residents, individually and collectively, 
would not discriminate against minorities, whether they are women, LGBT 
people, people with disabilities, or foreigners.69
Immediately after Shibuya’s announcement about the proposed 
ordinance, Setagaya Ward councillor Kamikawa posted on Twitter, saying, 
“We follow suit.”70 Since there was a slim chance to pass such an ordinance 
at the conservative-dominated Setagaya Assembly, Setagaya Mayor Nobuto 
Hosaka used his discretionary power to issue the yōkō gyōsei (administrative 
guidelines) for addressing the issue of same-sex couples in Setagaya Ward. 
On November 5, 2015, neighbouring Setagaya Ward started issuing 
partnership certificates to same-sex couples. Geographical proximity is likely 
to encourage the diffusion of policy ideas, but policy entrepreneurs must 
exploit the proximity for policy innovations.71 They tend to adopt a policy 
innovation when they interact with their neighbours who share an interest 
in a specific policy area.72 In May 2014 Kamikawa was invited by the mayor 
of Takarazuka City, Tomoko Nakagawa, in the Kansai region, to a training 
session for its employees to talk about the necessity of LGBT policy. On June 
1, 2016, Takarazuka, home of the cross-dressing all-female theatre troupe 
Takarazuka Revue, also began issuing official partnership certificates for 
same-sex couples. A history of progressive local affairs certainly supported 
the crafting of the local policy.73 Mayor Nakagawa was cited as saying, “We 
hope as many people as possible use it [same-sex partnership certificates],” 
while drawing on Setagaya’s experience of yōkō gyōsei.74 Policy innovation 
68  Esmralda, Dōsei pātonāshippu shōmei hajimarimas, 50–51.
69  Esmralda, Dōsei pātonāshippu shōmei hajimarimas, 56–58.
70  Esmralda, Dōsei pātonāshippu shōmei hajimarimas, 84.
71  Jack L. Walker, “The diffusion of innovations among American states,” American Political Science 
Review 63 (1969): 880–899; Francis S. Berry and William D. Berry, “Innovation and diffusion models 
in policy research,” in Theories of the Policy Process, ed. P.A. Sabatier (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1999), 172–178.
72  Michael Mintrom and Sandra Vergari, “Policy networks and innovation diffusion: the case of 
state education reforms,” The Journal of Politics 60, no. 1 (1998): 126–148.
73  Tegtmeyer Pak, “Cities and local citizenships in Japan,” 67. For the history of the all-female 
Takarazuka Revue, see Jennifer Robertson, Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culture in Modern 
Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
74  “Takazuka-shi ga dōsei kappuru ni’ntei e” [City of Takarazuka will recognize same-sex couples], 










































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
front-runner Setagaya served as a point of reference for Mayor Nakagawa. 
Iga City in Mie and Naha City in Okinawa followed in Setagaya’s footsteps 
by starting to issue partnership certificates under the guidelines of yōkō gyōsei 
on April 1, 2016 and on July 8, 2016, respectively. Therefore, it appears that 
policy transfer will be a key determinant of LGBT policy adoption at the 
local level.
The theories of moral politics have been developed in a study area that 
seeks to examine an essentially domestic process of policy making. But policy 
adoption or policy change at the domestic level can take place in an 
international context where transnational actors and networks exert much 
of their influence on country policy. Since the Japanese national government 
remains indifferent to the demands of sexual minorities, LGBT communities 
have sought a transnational network for policy advocacy. In 1984 the Japanese 
branch of the International Gay Association (IGA) was established in Tokyo 
to promote civil rights in LGBT communities.75 In 1986 the first IGA Asian 
Conference was held in Tokyo. In 1994 the International Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA, formerly IGA) began to 
organize Japan’s first gay pride parade, the Tokyo Pride Parade. In 2012 when 
Shibuya Ward became interested in the issue of same-sex partnership, the 
local opportunity structure transformed into a significantly more open 
political environment for civil rights activism. Both their transnational 
linkages and the political openness allowed the LGBT groups to share the 
globally emerging norms of sexual minorities’ rights and foreign-originated 
policy ideas with Shibuya’s policy-making stakeholders. In other words, the 
role of policy diffusion played by non-governmental actors in transnational 
networks can be seen as a complement to the government-centric hard 
transfer.76
Without interest groups that are able to expand the scope of the conflict 
to electoral politics, there would be little need for the dominant governing 
coalition to reconsider its policy belief. However, the conservative politicians’ 
willingness to accept that homosexuality is not a mental disorder did not 
derive from changes to their core beliefs, but rather from international 
pressure to which they needed to quickly adjust. In 1990 the General Assembly 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) removed homosexuality from 
their list of mental disorders, since the panel of specialists came to recognize 
such a diagnostic reference as scientifically baseless. The ILGA was at the 
forefront of the campaign to hold the WHO accountable for considering 
75  In 1986, the International Gay Association (IGA) was renamed the International Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), which is the world federation of LGBT 
organizations dedicated to achieving equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and intersex 
people.
76  Diane Stone, “Transfer agents and global networks in the ‘transnationalization’ of policy,” 
Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 3 (2004): 545–566; Diane Stone, “Transfer and translation of 
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homosexuality to be a disease. In 1994 Japan’s Ministry of Health and Welfare 
followed the WHO’s decision by removing homosexuality from the mental 
disorder treatment list and in the same year the Ministry of Education also 
removed homosexuality from the categories of sexual misconduct listed in 
its administrative guidance.77 International organizations are authoritative 
venues of knowledge production, a role which provides them with substantial 
leverage to proselytize member states to initiate policy reform.
Conclusion
Shibuya’s stand-alone initiative was largely the result of decisions made by 
specific policy entrepreneurs who were able to invoke a combination of 
effective strategies, especially through the wise use of issue framing, while 
recognizing and acting upon structural opportunities for policy solutions. 
The case of Shibuya’s LGBT policy suggested two primary types of opportunity 
openings: a discretionary political opportunity which local authorities can 
exploit in the absence of national regulations, and an issue-specific 
opportunity upon which local authorities can act in the absence of a religious 
versus secular conflict in the party system. The entrepreneurs took advantage 
of this issue-specific opportunity to undertake pragmatic policy solutions 
rather than redistributing citizen values. Local authorities, with similar policy 
environments, were not all equally responsive to the issue of sexual minorities. 
Without Hasebe’s initiative as ward councillor and mayor, and former mayor 
Kuwabara’s commitment, the progressive proposal may never have got onto 
a policy agenda. There were also no locally active gay/lesbian organizations 
that could directly participate in the policy process that would conform to 
lobbying politics or interest group politics, although key policy makers had 
personal contact with LGBT individuals. The structure of decision making 
around the policy issue of same-sex partnership was shaped by a limited 
group of actors, i.e., the mayors, the Investigative Commission, and supportive 
ward councillors, who were heavily involved in the issue. The political conflict 
was fought with a limited scope where mayoral leadership minimized 
politicization of the decision-making processes. The policy image of same-sex 
partnership was framed from a perspective of community diversity, rather 
than that of divisive societal values or religious values so that the political 
conflict would not be expanded beyond the existing group of actors in the 
ward assembly. The mayor’s office successfully avoided reducing the issue of 
same-sex partnership to the legal sanction of what is normatively right or 
wrong. Otherwise, as morality politics theory predicts that moral disputes 
will reflect the influence of party and electoral competition, the case of 
77  “Dōseiai sabetsu no kijutsu seito shidōsho kara sakujo” [Remove the discriminatory description 










































































Shibuya’s LGBT Policy Adoption
Shibuya’s LGBT policy adoption could have been more politicized and 
become a socially divisive issue. As the issue of same-sex partnership hardly 
engaged the fundamental values of Shibuya’s voters, the opponents of LGBT 
rights were unable to effectively frame Shibuya’s same-sex partnership 
certificates as morality issues for voter mobilization. The core belief in sexual 
minorities’ rights prevailed in the policy agenda setting yet required the 
political manipulation of the policy process. The political process of Shibuya’s 
LGBT policy adoption had not evolved around the redistribution of societal 
values, but rather relied on utility considerations, such as material benefits 
and practical solutions for the day-to-day problems of sexual minorities. To 
prevent the politicization of the proposal, the mayor’s office needed to frame 
policy concerns that would promote Shibuya’s vitality, raising the salience of 
economic considerations as well as the international reputation for Shibuya. 
The policy processes of Shibuya’s same-sex partnership fit neither morality 
politics nor interest group politics (within the category of pluralist influence), 
but rather resemble the politics of polyarchy, in which policy may be adopted 
by a set of limited agents for material interest representation, but then policy 
adoption cannot take place except within the process of the majority voters’ 
approval.
Curtin University, Perth, Australia, October 2016
